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2 1. Introduction
In 2005, Thomas Schelling shared the Nobel Prize in Economics "for having enhanced
our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis" with Robert
Aumann. Schelling is certainly not a typical game theorist and has himself observed that
he retails game theory without the mathermatics (Mirowski 2002, p. 367). Indeed, game
theorists such as Martin Shubik have criticized Schelling for inadequately understanding
and applying the central theorems of game theory (Ayson 2004, p. 131). Others have
countered that “Schelling’s work shows that it is possible to be clear, precise, and
logically rigorous without being overtly mathematical” (Dixit 2006, p. 228).
At the time of the Nobel announcement, Schelling was Professor of Economics at
the University of Maryland. Even before completing his Ph.D. at Harvard University in
1951, he had worked for the U.S. Bureau of the Budget and the Economic Cooperation
Administration in Europe. The latter involved negotiating for the European Payments
Union as part of the Marshall Plan. Schelling worked on implementing the Marshall Plan
with John McNaughton and U.S. ambassador Averell Harriman, who was later appointed
Secretary of Trade by President Truman. Upon obtaining his Ph.D., he served two years
at the White House and the Executive Office of the President, following Harriman. Here
he moved from the foreign aid plan to the Mutual Security Program. While involved with
foreign aid bureaus and working on negotiations, Schelling’s attention became focused
on the prevalence of bargaining situations. His governmental tour of duty was followed
by five years at Yale University and thirty-two at Harvard University. While there, he
served as a mentor to students who would later become very well-known, such as
3Richard Nelson, Daniel Ellsberg, and Michael Spence. During this period, he also
became an adjunct fellow of the RAND Corporation in 1956 and full-time senior staff
member there in 1958-1959. He had been recruited by RAND to work on new strategic
thinking, with intellectuals such as Herman Khan and Albert Wohstetter. Schelling’s
impressive curriculum vitae, including The Strategy of Conflict (Schelling 1960),
Micromotives and Macrobehavior (Schelling 1978), and Choice and Consequence
(Schelling 1984a), earned him a fellowship of the American Association of Arts and
Sciences and a membership of the National Academy of Sciences, the latter of which
granted him the National Academy of Sciences Award for Behavioral Research Relevant
to the Prevention of Nuclear War. He further served as president of the American
Economic Association as well as the Eastern Economic Association.
Schelling began in “traditional economist fashion” (Zeckhauser 1989, p. 156),
focusing on central problems, advancing simple formulations, and describing his results
in lucid and vivid language. Indeed, his academic career began in the area of international
economics, and especially trade and tariffs. Yet, “[o]nce the vital game of survival in a
nuclear age challenged Schelling’s attention, mere economics could no longer contain
him” (Samuelson in Zeckhauser 1989, p. 157). Along the way, he developed novel
insights on a dazzling range of topics, stressing the applicability of his analysis to a broad
set of actors and problems, including military strategy and arms control, energy and
environmental policy, climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, organized crime,
foreign aid and international trade, conflict and bargaining theory, racial segregation and
integration, the military draft, health policy, tobacco and drugs policy, child rearing, taxi
driving, investing in the stock market, tax collecting, house buying and selling, voting,
4playing charades, striking, price wars, traffic jams, kidnapping, daylight savings,
etiquette, Lot’s wife, selecting Miss Rheingold, as well as a variety of ethical issues in
public policy and business, to name just “a few.” In the process, he brought game theory
to life through the use of lively and memorable examples and appeals to their relevance
for the political, social, economic, and personal lives of people (Dixit 2006).
The Nobel Prize citation praised Schelling for showing that many familiar social
interactions could be viewed as non-cooperative games that involve both common and
conflicting interests. And it highlighted his efforts, dating mostly from the 1950s and
1960s, to apply game theoretic insights to an understanding of global security and the
(nuclear) arms race. It further singled out The Strategy of Conflict (Schelling 1960),
Strategy and Arms Control (Schelling and Halperin 1961), and Arms and Influence
(Schelling 1966), and noted that the first of these has influenced generations of strategic
thinkers.
Schelling is very much a product of the so-called Cold War regime of science
organization and funding, as related in the second part of this paper. The story of
Schelling’s success in the area of military strategy and arms control is related in the third
part of this paper. This prompted some to suggest that the Nobel Prize in Economics that
Schelling received for his work on game theory in the 1950s and 1960s could have easily
been the Nobel Peace Prize (e.g., Wright 2005). Yet, little is known about the crucial role
he played in formulating the strategies of “controlled escalation” and “punitive bombing”
that plunged the United States into war with Vietnam, which is the focus of the fourth
part of this paper. Indeed, this has led some to argue that the dark side of Schelling
5disqualified him for the Peace Prize, upon which he received the Nobel in Economics as a
consolation prize (e.g., Kaplan 2005).
2. Cold War Regime
A quick glance at science during the twentieth century, focusing mostly on the United
States, allows one to identify three regimes (Mirowski and Sent 2002, pp. 10-32): (1) the
proto-industrial regime from the start of the century until 1940; (2) the Cold War regime
from World War II through the Cold War; and (3) the globalized privatization regime
from 1980 until the present. During the first regime, colleges and universities were
mostly focused on education and liberal arts. With most research and development taking
place at a few large corporations, science was largely defined by the captains of industry
and their managers. Science received little to no support from the government, reflecting
the fact that Americans had great trouble coming to terms with the nascent idea of public
funding for science. The Cold War regime on the other hand was characterized by a
massive government presence in the planning and funding of science. More specifically,
most federal funding for research and development was channeled through private
corporations, thereby skewing the technological exploration in selected industries. At the
same time, the government defended a “communal” approach to the appropriation of the
fruits of subsidized research, as evidenced by its weak property protection and active
antitrust policy. These arrangements came to an end due to the continued political and
economic obstacles faced by government subsidies, the universities acting more and more
like corporations, the globalization of science, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
6These developments ushered in what may be labeled the globalized privatization regime,
characterized by increased privatization of not only research but also the teaching
functions of the university. At the same time, corporations have been scrambling to
reinvent contract research, supported by a more lenient antitrust policy as well as more
stringent legal strictures on intellectual property.
As noted before, Schelling’s contributions fit squarely within the Cold War
regime. World War II stimulated the move in economics towards monism about beliefs,
ideology, theories, models, and policy advice. During the war, heavy demands had been
placed on economists to develop tools for solving policy problems. Sharing in the glory
of the subsequent victory, economists emerged with a firm belief in the formalism that
characterized neoclassical economics. While economics became associated with a certain
tool-kit as opposed to a particular area of study, the formalism further supported
economists’ efforts to gain identity as a “national science,” to achieve professional status.
As Mary Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford (1998b, p. 19) note: “[T]he transformation
into formal economics involved changes in language, form, and tools. This new style
became a set of mores that reduced in itself the possibility of pluralism in economics.”
To fully understand the transformation that took place, one must not only
appreciate the changing nature of mathematics and mathematical economics, but also the
multiple dimensions of the process that ushered in the Cold War regime. While there had
been a focus on personal qualities and attitudes of economists during the interwar period,
objectivity came to be associated with a particular set of methods, namely mathematics
and statistics, after World War II. At the same time, economists gradually moved away
from advocacy. The success of the new set of methods with which neoclassical
7economists came out of World War II instilled in them a belief in the ideas behind them.
Simultaneously, American society moved from a desire for economic intervention
towards support for free markets and open competition.
During the Cold War period, the technical turn in economics was intensified as a
result of a continued narrowing in the range of beliefs, an additional tightening of
acceptable ways of expressing them, and open prosecution during the McCarthy period.
Morgan and Rutherford (1998b, p. 24) conclude that the rise of the Cold War regime took
place “within structures involving patrons and hierarchies operating within the context of
a political and economic society that supported calls for economic intervention in the
interwar period and for free markets in the postwar period.”
Schelling was very much witness to the massive government presence in the
planning and funding of science that occurred during the Cold War regime as a result of
his close ties with the RAND Corporation and the Department of Defense, as elaborated
in the following section. He further very much benefited from the transformation into
formal economics that occurred at the same time. Indeed, he employed the new insights
when formulating advice concerning strategic policy problems, to which we now turn.
3. Success Story
Sharing in the postwar glory of rational choice theory, Schelling became a key
contributor to rational defense strategy. Indeed, postwar international economic policy
and military questions were intertwined. Schelling had learned about bargaining as a
trade negotiator in international conferences dealing with U.S. foreign aid. This inspired
8him to see war as an especially violent form of bargaining. According to Schelling (1960,
p. 8) strategy’s theoretical development had been retarded because “the military services,
in contrast to almost any other sizable and respectable profession, have no identifiable
academic counterpart.” This changed in large part due to Schelling’s efforts. As a result,
he played a defining role in shaping the ideas underpinning the “golden age” of security
studies, stretching from 1955 until 1965 (Ayson 2004; Baldwin 1996). This period was
dominated by nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited
war. The central question was how states could use weapons of mass destruction as an
instrument of policymaking, given the risk of any nuclear exchange. At the time, inspired
by a need to address the nuclear challenge and a concern about the erosion of the
advantage of the United States, a replacement was needed for the Eisenhower
Adminstration strategy of “massive retaliation.” And this was found in Schelling’s focus
on “limited war”.1 This concept was later adopted by President Johnson and Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara during the early years of the Vietnam War, as discussed in
the next section.
Schelling’s insights became known as rigorous, innovative, and clever. As a
result, he had a profound, pervasive, and enduring influence over strategic discourse.
Indeed, he was a leading figure among the American “defense intellectuals” during this
so-called golden age. At the same time, he was criticized for developing ideas that were
perilously lacking in the mud, blood, and local political determinants of real history.
Indeed, he rarely considered specific weapons or historical battles. As we will see in the
                                                 
1 See Philip Mirowski (2002, p. 368): “[R]ejecting the previous Air Force doctrine of
massive nuclear retaliation, [Schelling] rendered the concept of ‘limited war’ palatable,
and the pursuit of ‘arms control’ just another strategic move in a game of threats and
counterthreats.”
9next section, this came to haunt him during the Vietnam War. For now, let us stick to the
story of Schelling’s success. Schelling studied war at the RAND Corporation, where he
spent some time in the late 1950s. Specifically, in 1956 he joined a discussion group of
RAND on the East Coast. As a result of spending the summer of 1957 at RAND, he
became increasingly drawn into the study of military problems. And he considered his
year at RAND in 1958-1959 the most productive and instrumental single year of his
career, inspired by the company of other strategic thinkers. In Philip Mirowski’s (2002)
opinion, Schelling is “the most successful popularizer of the RAND doctrine that game
theory was chock full of perceptive insights about military and social organizations” (p.
330).
RAND, which stands for Research ANd Development (or, as some insiders would
have it, Research And No Development),2 became operational in 1946 as a subsidiary of
Douglas Aircraft under contract with the Air Force. Amidst concerns on the part of
Douglas Aircraft regarding conflicts of interest in procuring contracts, the RAND
Corporation became independent in 1948, though it continued to be funded largely by the
Air Force until 1962 (Hounshell 1997, p. 265).3 According to Hounshell (1997), “RAND
sought to build a ‘science of warfare,’ whereby the overall performance of the Air Force
could be optimized” (p. 244). Moreover, the Air Force’s strategy to donate large sums of
money for this endeavor was not without results, as suggested by head of the RAND
computer science department Paul Armer: “I think a good deal of RAND’s success in the
                                                 
2 See Richard Bellman (1984, p. 134): “A common joke is that it really stands for
‘Research and No Development’.” Bellman (1984, p. 134) actually writes that the letters
stand for “Research and New Development” and Simon (1991, p. 115) believes RAND is
the acronym for “Research and National Development.”
3 Starting in 1956, RAND began diversifying its sponsorship mostly with contracts from
defense and defense-related agencies (Edwards 1996, p. 115).
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early days was due to the research philosophy of the Air Force, which said to RAND
management, ‘Here’s a bag of money, go off and spend it in the best interests of the Air
Force’” (Armer in McCorduck 1979, p. 117). This bountiful budget enabled RAND to
attract the top of the research crop.4 For its researchers, RAND had “the advantages of a
university, namely freedom of choice in research and smart colleagues to do it with, and
none of the disadvantages of straitened budgets or burdensome teaching” (Newell in
McCorduck 1979, pp. 118-119).
Jardini (1996) notes than “RAND’s situation within the national security complex
and its military sponsorship had profound effects on the nature of its intellectual
products” (p. 6). The independent and interdisciplinary research at the RAND “think
tank” contributed to cyborg fields such as computer and software design, materials
science, space systems, and systems analysis (Jardini 1996, p. iv). It concentrated on such
problems as launching and orbiting artificial satellites, using atomic fission in airplane
propulsion, maximizing the performance of airplanes, developing titanium and other
advanced materials, and evaluating the damaging effects of nuclear bombs (Hounshell
1997, p. 242).
Alain Enthoven joined RAND at the same time as Schelling, in 1956, and
participated in continuing studies on U.S. and NATO defense strategies. In 1960, he
moved to the Department of Defense, where he held several positions leading to
appointment, by President Johnson, to the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Systems Analysis in 1965. About Schelling, Enthoven noted: “He contributed many
insights about the logic of threats, what makes them credible and effective versus
                                                 
4 In fact, the salaries at RAND were roughly fifty percent higher than their equivalents at
universities (Edwards 1996, p. 116).
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incredible and ineffective. I associate him with an emphasis on the importance of such
qualitative distinctions as nuclear versus non-nuclear weapons, our territory versus their
territory, and the like” (Enthoven in Zeckhauser 1989, p. 159).
Like Enthoven, Schelling also had close ties with the Department of Defense, as
elaborated further in the next section. Beginning in 1958 and continuing for the next
thirteen years, Schelling and others ran at least a dozen so-called political exercises
(Allen 1987, pp. 151-153). In 1961, for instance, he ran political exercise-style games in
the basement of the Pentagon under sponsorship of the Cold War Division of the Joint
War Games Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which became SAGA and then today’s
JAD (Mirowski 2002, p. 369). Also in 1961, the Pentagon sponsored several huge war
simulation games at Camp David that were run by Schelling, known as “the Berlin
games” (Allen 1987, p. 241; Kaplan 1983). Participants included John McNaughton,
Henry Kissinger, Alain Enthoven, and national security advisor McGeorge Bundy, some
of whom we encounter again in the next section. Though Schelling created provocative
scenarios, he could not get a war started and could not get either side to consider
seriously the use of nuclear weapons.
The foundations for a general theory of strategy developed by Schelling, as
alluded to before, consisted of nuclear deterrence, crisis management, limited war, arms
control, and coercion and compellence. His unique contribution involved viewing
strategic situations as bargaining processes. Let us explain. Focusing on the stand-off
between the United States and the Soviet Union, Schelling observed that the two super-
powers had both shared and opposing interests. Their shared interests involved avoiding a
nuclear war, while their opposing interests concerned dominating the other. As a result,
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conflict and cooperation became inseparable. While the essence of crisis is its
unpredictability, Schelling’s theory of “salience” explained that settlements will tend to
occur at certain prominent points that focus the expectations of both parties, known as
focal points. In game theory, these are used as a device for equilibrium selection.
Schelling focused in particular on how the United States and Soviet Union could
arrive at and stick to bargains by means of deterrence and compellence. The former
involved dissuading the other from doing something, while the latter referred to
persuading the other to do something. With deterrence, the opponent must be persuaded
that the costs outweigh the benefits of an action, while with compellence, the opponent
must be convinced of the reverse. Deterrence and compellence are supported by means of
threats and promises. Threats are costly when they fail and successful when they are not
carried out. Promises are costly when they succeed and successful when they are carried
out. Since the exploitation of potential force is better than the application of force, it is
key to use threats and promises while avoiding to act upon these.
The challenge is to communicate threats and promises in a credible manner.
Indeed, the credibility of threats and promises, Schelling argued, is central to nuclear
deterrence and control of the arms race. And here he developed some counter-intuitive
results. For instance, apparent irrationality, recklessness, or unreliability turn out to be a
good way to achieve credibility and can therefore be strategically rational. For instance,
when a country makes a threat that would be irrational to carry out, Schelling argued, its
credibility could be enhanced if the country appears to be irrational. In addition, a country
may be better off by limiting its choices in advance, known as precommitment. The tactic
of physical irrevocable commitment shifts the burden of initiating violence to the
13
opponent. Moreover, a country needs a credible second-strike capacity to deter a pre-
emptive first strike. In other words, a county needs its missiles to survive such an attack.
Hence, populations are better protected by protecting missiles. In other words, the ability
to hurt people is conducive to peace, while the ability to destroy weapons increases the
risk of war. Such counter-intuitive insights became known as the paradox of deterrence.
Since deterrence is never fully credible, the best deterrent might involve precommitment,
some element of randomness, or a partly crazy leader. Indeed, Schelling briefly served as
an advisor to the filmmaker Stanley Kubrick, the director of Dr. Strangelove.
Schelling devoted the better part of two decades to understanding the great power
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of deterrence,
stability, and the like. He interpreted stability as a balance of deterrence. And his insights
on the stability of a system fit right in with the systems analysis approach for which
RAND became so well known. A strong critic of the doctrine of massive retaliation,
Schelling appealed to game theory to make limited war appear almost casual. His insights
cast a new light on crises in the early 1960s such as Berlin and Cuba and further inspired
the United States approach to conducting the limited war in Vietnam, as elaborated in the
next section.
Schelling has been criticized on at least four points (Williams 1991). First, he
appears insensitive to ethical considerations. Second, he lacked deep historical
knowledge. Third, he was more concerned with maximizing coercive impact than with
minimizing risk. Finally, the assumptions of artificial “strategic man” have been found to
be problematic. Some of these criticisms had serious repercussions, to which we now
turn.
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4. Glory Gone
Schelling’s role in the Vietnam War casts a dark shadow over the success story related in
the previous section. In fact, some hold him responsible for plunging the United States
into war with Vietnam (Ayson 2004; Freedman 1996; Kaplan 1983; Kuklick 2006). The
story starts with the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964, during the first year of
Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration. The Tonkin Incident was an alleged pair of attacks
by North Vietnamese gunboats on two American destroyers. It resulted in the passage of
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted the President authority to assist any
Southeast Asian country whose governments were in jeopardy. For Johnson, it served as
a legal justification for introducing American troops into the Vietnam War, which had
begun in the late 1950s. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, then, defined the beginning of
large-scale involvement of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. Johnson ordered a series of
“retaliatory” air strikes against North Vietnamese installations for the stated purpose of
discouraging further “Communist aggression.” The Tonkin Gulf bombing executed by
the President was a prime example of rational signaling. This returns us to Schelling, who
is best known for his conception of limited war as a form of signaling and who had many
ties to the Department of Defense.
When Paul Nitze became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs in the winter of 1960-1961, he made Schelling a job offer as his arms
control deputy in the Department of Defense (Kaplan 1983; Kuklick 2006). Averell
Harriman, whom we encountered earlier as a colleague of Schelling during the Marshall
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Plan implementation, already worked as Nitze’s assistant. Schelling declined, however,
but recommended his colleague and friend John McNaughton, who was professor of law
at Harvard University, instead, promising to advise the latter on weapons and strategy.
Schelling and McNaughton had been friends from the late 1940s when both were helping
with the administration of the Marshall Plan in Paris. McNaughton subsequently became
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s general counsel and chief aide on arms control.
He later succeeded Paul Nitze as Assistant Secretary of Defense. Indeed, he was one of
McNamara’s closest advisors on the Vietnam strategy. As noted by Sonja Amadae (2003,
p. 60): “McNamara found in Thomas Schelling a likeminded individual, similarly
committed to rational analysis, who could provide him with the counsel and methods he
required to run the defense department.” In addition, Schelling’s former student Daniel
Ellsberg, a bargaining expert like his mentor, was on duty in the Pentagon during the
Tonkin Incident. He further noted that he “hadn’t realized how close Kissinger and
Schelling were too” (Ellsberg 2002, p. 234). Ellsberg, of course, later became famous for
making the so-called Pentagon Papers public (Ellsberg 2002).
Planning to step up military action against North Vietnam in response to the
Tonkin Incident, Schelling’s concept of coercive warfare shaped the resulting strategy of
“controlled escalation” and “punitive bombing” (Kaplan 1983). Especially John
McNaughton wanted to control force rationally. There was a great interest in de
Department of Defense to intimidate the North by means of an escalation of the conflict.
Afraid of a repetition of North Korean errors in Vietnam, national security advisor
McGeorge Bundy asked McNaughton and Schelling to develop a gradual strategy.
McNaughton was aware that air power was the logical instrument for prompt results.
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However, he struggled with the question as to what kind of bombing campaign would
best ensure that the North Vietnamese picked up the proper signals and responded
accordingly. It was with this question that he approached his friend and former colleague
Schelling. The latter reasoned that a bombing campaign should not last more than a few
weeks. Yet, in the end, he had difficulty coming up with a single plausible answer to the
most basic of questions with which McNaughton confronted him. In Robert Kalpan’s
(1983, p. 335) opinion: “Thomas Schelling, when faced with a real-life ‘limited war’ was
stumped, had no idea where to begin.”
Operation Rolling Thunder was the code name for the U.S. military campaign
inspired by Schelling. Started in March 1965, it was the first of three sustained bombing
campaigns against North Vietnam, followed in 1972 by Operation Linebacker and
Operation Linebacker II. By then, however, Schelling had backed off from the Vietnam
War. The objectives of Operation Rolling Thunder were to destroy the will of the North
Vietnamese to fight, to destroy their industrial base and air defenses, and to stop the flow
of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Afraid the war might escalate out of
hand, Johnson and McNamara micromanaged the bombing campaign from Washington.
However, the Schelling-inspired policy of “graduated response” meant that more targets
were incrementally authorized for attack. Yet, whereas Schelling had told McNamara that
the campaign should be given three weeks to produce results, the situation was bad and
deteriorating. Still, Schelling testified on behalf of the administration in the U.S. Senate
about the development and use of rational policy tools throughout the U.S. Department of
Defense in 1968. Convinced that airpower could not win the war, Johnson ended
Operation Rolling Thunder on October 31, 1968, just prior to the 1968 Presidential
17
election. And Robert McNamara left his post as a result of the failure of the bombing
campaign.
Unfortunately, Schelling had postulated a purity about war that it does not have.
Hence, in addition to the limitations of the theory, he misconceived the factual substance
of the affair in the Tonkin Gulf and the intricacies involved in the subsequent Operation
Rolling Thunder. Disillusioned, he turned his attention away from war. During the mid-
1960s, interest in national security matters faded, partly due to the United States disaster
in Vietnam. Also, the urgency of the situation was tempered. And researchers had nearly
exhausted the possibilities for developing the theory from the problems of the nuclear
age. Indeed, in 1970 Schelling joined a group of Harvard scholars who resigned as
consultants in protest against the United States invading Cambodia. When he ceased to be
a government consultant, his access to classified information and to an always interested
audience was cut off. Though now a critic of the invasion in Cambodia, Schelling had
been crucial in the development of the policy. Moreover, unlike Ellsberg and McNamara,
Schelling never apologized for not reflected on his role in the Vietnam War.
5. Concluding Thoughts
Wars have winners and losers. Though this insight hardly requires an academic analysis,
the fact that science has been on the winning side of the (cold) wars during the past
century, does offer plenty of food for academic thought. As World War I approached, the
military commenced funding scientific research aimed at advancing military inventions.
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During World War II, the development of radar and nuclear weapons produced an
unparalleled position of prestige and power for the sciences. During the Cold War period,
these developments were extended and intensified through a massive growth of military
funding for the sciences.
The twentieth century (cold) wars have influenced not only the context of science
but also the content of research. For instance, the emergence of a military-university and
military-industry complex may be observed in the aftermath of World War II. In the
context of this so-called Cold War regime, the goals of scientific research included the
winning of the Cold War and the administration of high profits to defense and defense-
related industries.
And it was within this context that Schelling rose to prominence as one of the
leading strategy experts. In developing his insights, he relied heavily on game theory. As
a result, he became one of the main players in efforts to use game theory to tackle real-
world problems. Yet, Schelling struggled with the fact that the fit between theory and
practice was not as good as it may at first have seemed. While theory may observe an
unambiguous pattern, practice evidenced a confusing chain of events. Whereas Schelling
had laid bare the inherent logic of coercive bargaining, he discovered that the real world
cannot be expected to conform closely to deductive logic. In the opinion of Phil Williams
(1991, p. 120): “Schelling engaged in cerebral exercises in violence that were so
elaborate that they overlooked practical constraints.” At the same time, he was certainly
not unusual in his efforts, as noted by Fred Kaplan (2005): “The dark side of Thomas
Schelling is also the dark side of social science — the brash assumption that neat theories
not only reflect the real world but can change it as well, and in ways that can be precisely
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measured.” Indeed, the social sciences continually struggle to find a balance between
offering precise predictions and capturing the complexity of social interactions. And
during the Cold War period the balance often tipped in favor of theory as opposed to
practice. However, problems loomed large on the theory side of the scale as well.
As elaborated by Abu Rizvi (1994, 1998), there were many frictions within the
Nash program. First, the folk theorem illustrates the (very real) possibility of
encountering multiple equilibria in repeated games. Second, intuitively unreasonable
equilibria may be selected in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, the chain
store paradox, and the centipede game. In these games, the standard game-theoretic
solutions yield results that are considered quite unintuitive. This fact has prompted game
theorists to consider the appropriateness of the basic solution concepts. Finally, under
certain conditions, theorems concerning the non-existence of trade and the impossibility
of "agreeing to disagree" about an event have been proved for Nash equilibria. Moreover,
speculative trade cannot be explained as an outcome of different information structures.
It could be argued that one response of game theorists to these problems has been
to incorporate bounded rationality. First, bounded rationality functioned as a dynamic for
selection among multiple equilibria by promising to “refine” equilibria. Moreover, the
evolutionary stable strategy concept of evolutionary game theory may be viewed as a
further refinement of perfect equilibrium, one of the most common notions used to refine
the Nash equilibrium. Second, bounded rationality has been used to rule out unintuitive
equilibria in the prisoner’s dilemma game, the chain store paradox, and the centipede
game.
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The responses to the problems associate with game theory have led Schelling’s
fellow Nobel Laureate Robert Aumann (1997, p. 8) to note: “You must be super-rational
to deal with my irrationalities ... Thus, a more refined concept of rationality cannot feed
on itself only; it can only be defined in the context of irrationality”. And with his co-
author Sylvain Sorin, Aumann further commented that “rationality in games depends
critically on irrationality” (Aumann and Sorin 1989, p. 37). And this reminds us of
Schelling’s observation that apparent irrationality turns out to be a good way to achieve
credibility and can therefore be strategically rational. Perhaps he should have been aware
of his own irrationality when attempting to apply use game theory to tackle the intricacies
of the Vietnam War.
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